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In his article Stijn Bruers presents an axiology which includes well-being 
and biodiversity. On his account, however, the latter has much more 
importance than the former. Tremendous gains in well-being are pro-
scribed when they can only be obtained through a great loss in biodiversity. 
That is why we should not phase out predation by genetically reprogram-
ming predators. I argue that, even if we value biodiversity, it cannot be 
that important. This is shown, first, by considering the results of Bruers’ 
account regarding the sacrifice of both nonhuman and human interests. 
Second, I suggest how rejecting Bruers’ view on biodiversity has acceptable 
implications regarding his two other worries, r-selection and the inadvert-
ent killing of sentient invertebrates.
1. introduction
According to Stijn Bruers there are two things that are to be pursued as 
ends, rather than as means to further ends. The first of these is well-being. 
The second is biodiversity, or “[a]ll variation in life forms, entities and 
processes that are the direct result of natural evolution, where natural 
evolution is generated by random genetic mutations”. There are instances 
in which one of these ends can only be pursued at the expense of the 
other. Sometimes, the interests of sentient beings will outweigh the value 
of biodiversity. Some other times, the value of biodiversity is the one to 
be promoted, all things considered. Thus, we need an account about the 
relative strength of these values and the reasons for acting we are to derive 
from them. Bruers partially tackles these issues in formulating a principle 
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(the 3-N-principle) about what we have most reason to do across a variety 
of cases. These include, most importantly, the phenomenon of predation.
If biodiversity is to be valuable as an end (or intrinsically valuable, 
using Bruers’ phrase), then it is possible, in principle, that there are certain 
kinds of behavior which are so instrumental to the preservation of biodi-
versity that we always have decisive reasons to allow them to happen. The 
idea is that when one of these behaviors is prevented, the loss in biodi-
versity is so great that it cannot be compensated for by the gains in well-
being, if any, which would obtain (p. 87). Of course, to entail such a strong 
conclusion, these kinds of behaviors must be specified in such a way as 
to make it indeed the case that great amounts of value are lost if they are 
prevented. Bruers performs such specification through the 3-N-principle, 
which identifies the relevant categories of behaviors as those who are, at 
the same time, natural, normal and necessary. Suppose that there is some 
kind of behavior that is the direct result of the blind processes of natural 
evolution (naturalness) and which is sufficiently widespread among a large 
group of life forms (normalcy). As Bruers says, this is the kind of behavior 
that contributes, and tremendously so, to biodiversity. Suppose, moreover, 
that it is instrumental to the existence of those life forms among which it is 
widespread (necessity). We can then infer that if such life forms disappear, 
so will too that kind of behavior and, with it, a great amount of biodiversity 
value. That is why, according to Bruers, these kinds of behavior are to be 
allowed, no matter how detrimental to the well-being of the sentient indi-
viduals affected by them.
Predators need to feed on other sentient beings for survival. Since 
predation is a very widespread natural behavior, it is covered by the 
3-N-principle. According to Bruers, then, predation, as a type of behavior, 
is morally allowed and we always have decisive reasons not to prevent it. I 
believe, however, that he is misguided. Bruers raises many issues in his arti-
cle. Here, however, I can only focus but on a few of them. First, I will argue 
that even if we value biodiversity as Bruers does, we should not endorse his 
3-N-principle. Finally, I will show how we can provide plausible answers 
to his worries about r-selection and bodily motion. The upshot of this is 
that predation is an undesirable phenomenon which we have very strong 
reasons to phase out.
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2. thE 3-n-principlE and thE rElativE wEight
 of wEll-bEing
The 3-N-principle is a hypothesis on the result of our balance of reasons 
when our reasons to promote well-being and our reasons to preserve biodi-
versity conflict. Regarding predation, it suggests that the loss in biodiversity 
value caused by phasing out predators cannot be outweighed by the gain in 
well-being which would result. However, that is not so.
Consider a planet in which life has been evolving for billions of years, 
producing rich and complex ecosystems. These are inhabited by innumer-
able sentient beings, who are constantly beset by a series of natural harms, 
including predation. Eventually, some of them evolve complex cognitive 
capacities and, over time, develop a process to genetically reprogram 
predators into herbivores. That would amount to a variation in a life form 
achieved through artificial means, that is, by a “conscious, reflective, non-
instinctive invention” (p. 87). Thus, a whole pattern of natural behavior 
would have been eliminated, not through substitution by another natural 
behavior, equally valuable in terms of biodiversity, but by an artificial one, 
valueless in that respect. Certainly, on Bruers’ definition of biodiversity, 
much value would be lost in the process of reprogramming predators. Yet 
much suffering would be prevented as well. The 3-N-principle asks us to 
assess, on the one hand, the overall improvement in net well-being pro-
duced by the fact that present and future animals will no longer be preyed 
upon. It also asks us, on the other hand, to assess the loss in biodiversity 
produced by the disappearance of the various instances of predation that 
would otherwise obtain. Finally, it tells us that the latter is too great to be 
compensated by the former. But how can that be so?
If indeed the value of biodiversity obtains with any variation “in life 
forms, entities and processes that are the direct result of natural evolution” 
it seems, first, that it has no negative scale. Losses in biodiversity never 
reduce it below zero, but are restricted to movements along a positive scale. 
Second, this means that it is ever increasing and that, with the passage of 
time, any past loss in biodiversity can be compensated by future variations. 
That is to say that, even if after phasing out predation the biodiversity value 
of the planet at t1 is less than it would have been if predation continued to 
exist, such value may at t2 be as high due to the cumulative effect of varia-
tions in life forms over time.
It can be objected that the biodiversity value of the world at t2 is nev-
ertheless lower than the value it would have had at that time if predation 
persisted, assuming all other variations would have also taken place. This is 
possible, but on Bruers account, biodiversity must always be pitted against 
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well-being. Unlike biodiversity, well-being does possess a negative scale. It 
is fair to assume that most nonhuman animals living in the wild lead lives of 
net negative well-being. The mere phasing out of predation is probably not 
enough to ensure that these nonhuman individuals would enjoy lives at the 
positive side of the scale. Yet that can be ensured if we combine the phas-
ing out of predation with other interventions in nature which Bruers con-
siders unproblematic. Indeed, he seems to consider morally permissible to 
nourish animals that live in the wild and control their populations through 
contraceptive methods (p. 87, n. 1). But if contraception is permissible, 
then vaccination and similar methods for preventing and healing diseases 
must be as well. Hundreds of billions of animals live in the wild. Thus, even 
on Bruers’ account, it is possible to prevent the overwhelming majority of 
sentient beings from living lives of net negative well-being by paying the 
price of the loss in biodiversity produced by reprogramming predators.
We are assuming, in following Bruers, that the value of an outcome is 
a compound of its biodiversity value, which is always positive, and its well-
being value, which might be either or positive or negative. In these cases, 
we are contemplating the possibility of vastly reducing its negative well-
being value by eliminating a part of its positive biodiversity value. On these 
terms, it is highly implausible to say that we have decisive reasons not to 
phase out predation. But, if so, then the 3-N-principle fails as a hypothesis 
about our balance of reasons.
A possible way out is to claim that the importance of well-being, even 
negative well-being, is relatively low, when compared to biodiversity. Thus, 
we can imagine a spectrum of cases in which, at one end, we find the loss 
of value produced by the disappearance of predation, which is greater than 
the foreseeable increase in net well-being. At the other end of the spectrum, 
we find the negligible losses produced by preventing isolated instances of 
predation. It is implicit in Bruers’ treatment of these cases (p. 87, n. 1) that 
these losses actually can be compensated by gains in well-being, since he 
admits that we are permitted to intervene to save particular prey.
Let us now imagine a case in the middle of the spectrum. Consider 
an ecosystem on Earth in which, after a period of natural disasters, all 
predator species except one have become extinct. A severe drought fol-
lows, killing most of the herbivores on which these predators fed. We can 
foresee that, after a while, all predators will die of starvation. Suddenly, 
a herd of a new herbivore species migrates into the ecosystem. There are 
enough of them to feed the predators for the time they need until the local 
prey recover their numbers. On the other hand, we are in the possession of 
the necessary technology to reprogram predators into herbivores, thus pre-
venting both their death and the death of their prospective prey. Undoubt-
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edly, on the 3-N-principle, what we have most reason to do is to allow the 
predators to kill the new species, so that they can continue to exist in the 
future.
But consider now a variation of that case. Suppose that instead of a 
new migrating herbivore species, it is a previously unknown tribe of human 
beings who reach the ecosystem, fleeing from a severe famine. On Bruers’ 
account, each of these human beings has the moral permission to defend 
herself from the predators. As observers, though, we can tell with a high 
degree of probability that because they are weak and unprepared, they will 
all die. We can, however, easily reprogram the predators. What ought we 
to do?
It would be highly implausible to say that, in this case, we have decisive 
reasons not to reprogram the predators. That might cause some loss in bio-
diversity, but it also preserves the lives the tribe of human beings, without 
thereby causing the predators death by starvation. Actually, it is arguable 
that in this case we have decisive reasons to help the humans by repro-
gramming the predators. If that is so, consistency requires us to provide a 
similar answer in cases where the victims are nonhuman animals instead of 
humans. If, as Bruers himself recognizes, mere reference to species is arbi-
trary, we cannot explain our different treatment of these cases by pointing 
to the different species to which the prospective prey belong. When reflect-
ing in an unbiased way focusing on cases in which the victims are human 
beings, we clearly see how well-being cannot have such little importance 
when compared to biodiversity. Because we must reject speciesism, that 
cannot be the case either when nonhuman well-being is at stake.
Let us return to the first imaginary case and consider the entire phasing 
out of predation. We can now suppose that all present and future lives of 
net negative well-being that we could prevent by phasing out predation 
(combined with the other morally unproblematic interventions) are human, 
rather than nonhuman. That would be a much better world than the one 
in which hundreds of billions of humans lead miserable lives. But then, so 
would be the world in which these lives belong to nonhuman individuals.
Hence, even if biodiversity matters, it cannot matter as much as the 
3-N-principle implies. It tells us that the prevention of unfathomable 
amounts of net negative well-being is not worth the loss of the phenom-
enon of predation. On Bruers’ axiology, biodiversity simply counts too 
much, and the well-being of sentient individuals too little. That is plainly 
seen when considering its implications for human well-being. Rejecting 
speciesism forces us to take as seriously the well-being of nonhumans, who 
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3. thE iSSuES of r-SElEction and bodily motion
One of the virtues Bruers attaches to his 3-N-principle is its ability to ex-
plain as well his intuitions in favor of bodily motion and r-selection. When 
we move around, we kill insects (or sentient invertebrates, more generally), 
yet it does not seem to him that moving is morally impermissible. Most 
animals are r-selected, which causes a tremendous amount of suffering and 
death, yet it does not seem to him that we should eliminate this reproduc-
tive strategy. We do not need, however, the 3-N-principle in order to pro-
vide plausible answers to the issues raised by these two phenomena.
The issue of r-selection should not be worrisome once we perceive that 
well-being cannot be as unimportant, when compared to biodiversity, as 
Bruers claims. As he admits, the existence of r-selection causes billions of 
animals to be born only to die shortly thereafter, leading brief lives of net 
negative well-being. If we had the means to prevent that from happening 
without thereby causing more harm, we would surely have decisive reasons 
to do so. That is what follows form the considerations I made in the previ-
ous section, even taking into account the loss in biodiversity that would 
ensue.
Regarding bodily motion, we risk dismissing the possibility that there 
might be something objectionable with killing sentient invertebrates out 
of sheer prejudice. Because of their small size and their lack of cuteness it 
is harder for us to intuitively consider them as beings with interests which 
must be taken into consideration. If one worries that her treatment of 
these cases is biased in this way, one can try to counter the prejudice by 
imagining that we are discussing small, cute, furry rodents which we may 
inadvertently kill. 
All our activities have harmful effects, either seen or unforeseen. If, 
nevertheless, we can reasonably expect their positive value to outweigh 
the harm they might cause, we are justified in pursuing them. This is the 
case, for example, of activities which involve benefiting the worse-off, like 
nonhuman animals. Of course, we must think of less harmful alternatives 
to achieve the same valuable results or of ways in which we might allevi-
ate the negative consequences of our decisions that befall on other sentient 
individuals.
Invertebrates have interests, and we ought to take those interests into 
account in our decisions. If we are pursuing an activity with sufficiently 
expectable good effects and we are aware that we might unintentionally kill 
invertebrates what we must do is the same as if victims were cute rodents. 
We must avoid recklessness and be attentive, preventing as much harm as 
we can.
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4. concluSion
In an axiology that includes both well-being and biodiversity, the latter 
cannot have as much importance when compared to the former as the 
3-N-principle implies. First, denying so does not have counterintuitive 
results regarding either r-selection or bodily motion. Second, it forces us 
to either embrace highly implausible implications regarding the sacrifice of 
human well-being, or accept them with respect to nonhuman interests, but 
not with human ones – thereby incurring into speciesism.
Neither horn of the dilemma is admissible. The only admissible way 
out is amending the original theory, denying that biodiversity has such 
importance. Phasing out predation (in combination with other interven-
tions) would greatly improve the lives of hundreds of billions of nonhuman 
animals. Even if we value biodiversity, that is the kind of world we have 
decisive reasons to bring about.
